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INTRODUCTION

This article highlights the significant developments in Illinois labor and employment law during the Survey year.I During this period, the Illinois Supreme Court expanded the scope of retaliatory
discharge,2 declared unconstitutional a statute permitting employees to inspect their personnel files, 3 defined the scope of public employment statutes,4 and interpreted a time limitation provision in
* Partner, Ross & Hardies, Chicago, Illinois; A.B., 1971, University of California at
Berkeley; J.D., 1974, University of Wisconsin; M.S., 1984, Loyola University of Chicago.
** B.A., 1981, University of Wisconsin; J.D. candidate, 1990, Loyola University of
Chicago.
1. The Survey year covers developments in the law between July 1, 1987, and July 1,
1988.
2. See infra notes 7-34 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 116-39 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 140-259 and accompanying text.
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an unemployment compensation statute.5 Additionally, the United
States Supreme Court ruled that a union employee's retaliatory
discharge claim, brought under Illinois common law, is not preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act.6
II.

REBUTTING THE PRESUMPTION OF AT-WILL
EMPLOYMENT

A.
1.

Tort Claims

Retaliatory Discharge

The Illinois Supreme Court recognizes the tort of retaliatory discharge when an employee claims that he was discharged in retaliation for his activities and in violation of a clearly mandated public
policy.7 In Hinthorn v. Roland's of Bloomington, Inc.,8 the Illinois
Supreme Court expanded the tort of retaliatory discharge in the
context of claims involving employee rights under the Illinois
Workers' Compensation Act (the "Act"). 9 The court previously
held that an employee has a cause of action for retaliatory discharge when he is discharged in retaliation for filing a workers'
compensation claim against his employer.10 In Hinthorn, the court
held that retaliatory discharge may occur when an employee is discharged for orally requesting medical attention even though the
employee has not yet filed a workers' compensation claim."
5. See infra notes 260-80 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 35-71 and accompanying text.
7. Barr v. Kelso-Burnett Co., 106 Ill. 2d 520, 529, 478 N.E.2d 1354, 1358 (1985);
Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 129-30, 421 N.E.2d 876, 878
(1981); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 181-86, 384 N.E.2d 353, 357-59 (1978).
Retaliatory discharge is a narrow exception to the at-will doctrine. Barr, 106 Ill. 2d at
525, 478 N.E.2d at 1356. The at-will doctrine provides that an employee hired for an
indefinite period is an at-will employee and may be discharged for any reason or no reason at all. Id. The Barrcourt held that in order to state a claim for retaliatory discharge,
an employee must allege: 1) that he was discharged; 2) that the discharge was in retaliation for his activities; and 3) that the discharge violated a clearly mandated public policy.
Id. at 529, 478 N.E.2d at 1358.
8. 119 Ill. 2d 526, 519 N.E.2d 909 (1988).
9. Id. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, paras. 138.1-138.30 (1987).
10. Kelsay, 74 Ill. 2d at 178-81, 384 N.E.2d at 355-57. In Kelsay, the case in which
the Illinois Supreme Court first recognized the tort of retaliatory discharge, an at-will
employee claimed that she was discharged in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim. Id. at 178, 384 N.E.2d at 355. The court held that the employer's conduct
frustrated the purpose behind the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act, which is to provide employees with immediate, limited compensation for work-related injuries. Id. at
181-85, 384 N.E.2d at 357-58. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, paras. 138.1-138.30 (1987).
11. Hinthorn, 119 Ill. 2d at 534-35, 519 N.E.2d at 913-14. Prior to Hinthorn, the
Illinois Supreme Court had not directly addressed whether an employee may raise a retaliatory discharge claim when he had not yet filed a claim for workers' compensation under
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The employee in Hinthorn had filed workers' compensation
claims twice before. I2 The employee alleged that after she reported
a third injury and requested medical attention, her employer advised her to seek other employment and directed her to sign a resignation form. 3 The employee claimed that she involuntarily
signed the form without understanding its meaning because she
thought that she would lose her job if she refused.1 4 The employer
contended that the employee was not discharged, but that she had
voluntarily resigned when she signed the form.' 5 The employer
also maintained that the discharge did not violate the public policy
embodied in the Act because the Act protects a worker's
right to
16
compensation but not to medical attention itself.
In deciding that the employee sufficiently alleged the elements of
retaliatory discharge,"7 the Hinthorn court emphasized that it did
not decide the issue on a constructive discharge theory.' 8 This was
the Act. The court, however, had not ruled out the possibility of extending the reach of
retaliatory discharge based on policies underlying the Act. The court previously held
that an employee stated a cause of action for retaliatory discharge when he claimed that
he was discharged for filing a workers' compensation claim against a prior employer.
Darnell v. Impact Indus., 105 Ill. 2d 158, 159-62, 473 N.E.2d 935, 936-37 (1985). In
Beckman v. Freeman United Coal Mining Co., 123 Ill. 2d 281, 527 N.E.2d 303 (1988),
the court rejected an employee's retaliatory discharge claim based on the employee's intention to pursue a claim for his injury because the employer had no knowledge of that
intention. Id. at 287-90, 527 N.E.2d at 305-07.
Two Illinois appellate courts held that employees need not actually file workers' compensation claims to state a cause of action for discharge in retaliation for exercising their
rights under the Act. See Richardson v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 156 Ill. App. 3d 1006,
1010, 510 N.E.2d 134, 136-37 (2d Dist. 1987); Wolcowicz v. Intercraft Indus. Corp., 133
Ill. App. 3d 157, 161, 478 N.E.2d 1039, 1042 (1st Dist. 1985). See also Horton v. Miller
Chem. Co., 776 F.2d 1351, 1355-56 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1122 (1986),
and Burgess v. Chicago Sun Times, 132 Ill. App. 3d 181, 185, 476 N.E.2d 1284, 1287 (1st
Dist. 1985), wherein the courts held that there is no requirement in Illinois that employees must file workers' compensation claims before they can claim retaliatory discharge.
Moreover, in Fuentes v. Lear Siegler, Inc., No. 2-87-1201 (Ill. App. 2d Dist. Sept. 27,
1988) (LEXIS, States library, Ill. file), the court held that an employee must show that
the employer was aware of the employee's intention to file a workers' compensation
claim.
12. Hinthorn, 119 Ill. 2d at 528, 519 N.E.2d at 910.
13. Id. at 528-29, 519 N.E.2d at 910-11. The employee also was told that she had
been "getting hurt too much - costing the company too much money." Id. at 528, 519
N.E.2d at 911.
14. Id. at 529-30, 519 N.E.2d at 911.
15. Id. at 529, 519 N.E.2d at 911. The employer conceded that it had directed the
employee to sign the form to protect itself. Id. at 531, 519 N.E.2d at 912. The court
interpreted this to mean protection from claims of improper discharge. Id. at 531-32, 519
N.E.2d at 912.
16. Id. at 533, 519 N.E.2d at 913.
17. For the elements of a retaliatory discharge claim, see supra note 7.
18. Hinthorn, 119 Ill. 2d at 530-31, 519 N.E.2d at 911-12. An employee is constructively discharged if his employer deliberately compels the employee's involuntary resigna-

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 20

unnecessary, according to the court, because the employee alleged
actual discharge by claiming that the employer told her to seek
other employment. 9 Moreover, the employee's submission of a
voluntary resignation form did not preclude a showing of discharge. 20 The resignation form did not preclude actual discharge
because the employee alleged that she was directed to sign the
form, she did not understand the meaning of her action, and it was
clear from the alleged circumstances that if she had refused to sign
the form, she would have been fired anyway. 2I Hence, the court
held that the employee sufficiently alleged a discharge, notwithstanding her signature on the resignation form.22
After establishing that the employee adequately alleged actual
discharge, the court addressed whether the employee had properly
alleged that the discharge was in retaliation for the employee's activities. 23 The court noted that the employee's complaint was conclusory because it labelled the employer's action as retaliatory
without specifying the conduct for which she was discharged.24
Nonetheless, the court concluded that the complaint contained adequate facts to inform the employer that the employee claimed that
she was discharged in retaliation for requesting medical attention by causing or allowing the employee's working conditions to become intolerable.
Beye v. Bureau of Nat'l Affairs, 59 Md. App. 642, 653, 477 A.2d 1197, 1203 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1984). In a previous decision, the Illinois Appellate Court for the Fourth
District declined to extend the tort of retaliatory discharge to a claim grounded in a
constructive discharge. Scheller v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 138 Ill. App. 3d 219, 225,
485 N.E.2d 26, 30 (4th Dist. 1985), leave to appeal denied, 111 111. 2d 595 (1986). In
Scheller, the complaining employee voluntarily resigned after repeated harassment by her
employer. Id. at 221, 485 N.E.2d at 27. The Scheller court rejected the employee's argument that she was constructively discharged because her employer forced her to resign.
Id. at 222-24, 485 N.E.2d at 28-29. The court held that in order to state a cause of action
for retaliatory discharge, an employee must actually have been fired. Id. at 223-25, 485
N.E.2d at 29-30. The appellate court in Hinthorn distinguished Scheller by emphasizing
that, unlike the employee in Scheller, the Hinthorn employee resigned involuntarily.
Hinthorn v. Roland's of Bloomington, Inc., 151 Ill. App. 3d 1006, 1008, 503 N.E.2d
1128, 1129-30 (4th Dist. 1987). The Illinois Supreme Court in Hinthorn declined to decide whether a retaliatory discharge claim may be predicated upon a constructive discharge, stating that it had "no need to rule upon the viability of the constructive
discharge theory at this time, because the plaintiff alleges that she was actually and not
constructively discharged." Hinthorn, 119 Ill. 2d at 531, 519 N.E.2d at 912.
19. Hinthorn, 119 I11.2d at 531, 519 N.E.2d at 912.
20. Id. at 531-32, 519 N.E.2d at 912.
21. Id. The court stated that it would be "bitter irony" to permit employers "to
circumvent liability for retaliatory discharge by using their employees as unwitting tools
to escape responsibility for their tortious acts." Id. at 532, 519 N.E.2d at 912.
22. Id. at 531-32, 519 N.E.2d at 912.
23. Id. at 532, 519 N.E.2d 912.
24. Id.
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tion.25 Therefore, the complaint sufficiently alleged retaliation.26
The court then concluded that the employee also had adequately
alleged a violation of a clearly mandated public policy. 2" In reaching this conclusion, the court reasoned that the Act protects injured employees by ensuring that they receive medical attention as
well as compensation. 28 The court noted that the employer's dual
responsibility under the Act is to "provide and pay for" necessary
medical attention. 29 Therefore, requesting and seeking medical attention is the "crucial first step" in exercising workers' compensation rights. 30 Accordingly, the court concluded that a retaliatory
discharge action based on retaliation for requesting medical attention connected with a work-related injury is functionally
equivalent to a retaliatory discharge action based on discharge for
filing a workers' compensation claim. 31 The court reasoned that in
both instances an employee is being fired for asserting legal rights
to medical attention as provided for under the Workers' Compensation Act.3 2 Thus, the complaint adequately alleged a violation of
33
a clearly mandated public policy.
The Hinthorn decision extends the tort of retaliatory discharge
to include claims by employees who have not filed workers' compensation claims but have nonetheless asserted their rights under
the Act. Thus far, the scope of the Hinthorn decision beyond the
workers' compensation setting is unclear.34
25. Id. The court noted that the employee's complaint emphasized that the events
that triggered her discharge were her disclosure of the injury and her request for medical
attention. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 533, 519 N.E.2d at 913.
28. Id. at 533-34, 519 N.E.2d at 913. The court rejected the employer's argument
that the Act protects an employee's right to compensation but not to medical attention
itself. Id. at 533, 519 N.E.2d at 912.
29. Id. at 534, 519 N.E.2d at 913 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 138.8 (1987)).
30. Id.
31. Id. The court also noted that it would be anomalous to allow an employee who
has filed a workers' compensation claim to bring a retaliatory discharge action while
denying the same opportunity to an employee who was injured and fired before he had a
chance to file a claim. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 533-34, 519 N.E.2d at 912-13.
34. The Illinois Appellate Court for the First District has indicated that Hinthorn
may be limited to retaliatory discharge claims brought by employees who orally invoke
specifically guaranteed statutory rights. Abrams v. Echlin Corp., 174 Ill. App. 3d 434,
441-42, 528 N.E.2d 429, 434-35 (1st Dist. 1988). In Abrams, an employee claimed that
he was discharged in retaliation for threatening legal action against his employer under
the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act ("Wage Act"), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48,
paras. 39m-1 to 39m-15 (1987). Abrams, 174 Ill. App. 3d at 436-37, 528 N.E.2d at 431.
The employee claimed that his employer refused to pay him sales commissions allegedly
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Preemption

Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act
("LMRA") 35 allows an employee who is covered by a collective
bargaining agreement to bring an action in federal district court for
breach of the labor agreement.36 In Illinois, a union employee who
is discharged in retaliation for asserting his rights under the Illinois
Workers' Compensation Act has a cause of action against his employer for the tort of retaliatory discharge. 37 The Illinois Supreme
Court and the Seventh Circuit have reached conflicting decisions
as to whether section 301 prevents an employee from bringing a
retaliatory discharge claim in state court when the employee is covered by a collective bargaining agreement that provides that he
may not be discharged except for just cause. a In Lingle v. Norge
due under a written agreement between the two parties. Id. at 435, 528 N.E.2d at 430.
The court did not decide whether the employee had alleged a violation of a clearly mandated public policy under the Wage Act because the dispute centered on the proper interpretation of the written agreement and not a violation of the Wage Act itself. Id. at 442,
528 N.E.2d at 435. However, the court intimated that Hinthorn would not apply in that
case because neither the employee's complaint nor his argument on appeal alleged that he
was exercising any specific right guaranteed by the Wage Act. Id. at 441-42, 528 N.E.2d
at 434-35.
35. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982).
36. Id. Section 301(a) provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this
chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the
parties.
Id.
37. Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc., 105 I11.2d 143, 150, 473 N.E.2d 1280, 1283-84
(1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 909 (1985). For a discussion of retaliatory discharge in
Illinois, see supra notes 7-34 and accompanying text.
38. See Gonzalez v. Prestress Eng'g Corp., 115 I11.2d 1, 503 N.E.2d 308 (1986);
Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, 823 F.2d 1031 (7th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 1877
(1988). In Gonzalez, the Illinois Supreme Court held that section 301 does not preempt
state retaliatory discharge claims. Gonzalez, 115 Ill. 2d at 9, 503 N.E.2d at 311-12. The
union employees in Gonzalez brought retaliatory discharge claims against their employer,
claiming that the employer discharged them in retaliation for filing workers' compensation claims. Id. at 5, 503 N.E.2d at 310. The employer argued that section 301 preempted the retaliatory discharge claims because the employees were covered by a union
contract that contained a just cause provision. Id. at 6, 10, 503 N.E.2d at 310, 312.
According to the employer, the employees' retaliatory discharge claims depended upon
an interpretation of the terms of the just cause provision. Id. at 10, 503 N.E.2d at 312.
The Illinois Supreme Court reasoned that a retaliatory discharge claim is based on public
policy considerations, not interpretations of just cause provisions. Id. at 10-12, 503
N.E.2d at 312-13. Hence, the court held that retaliatory discharge is an independent
claim that is not preempted by section 301. Id. at 11-12, 503 N.E.2d at 313.
In contrast, the Seventh Circuit in Lingle held that section 301 preempts the retaliatory
discharge claims of union workers who have a contractual remedy for discharge without
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Division of Magic Chef,39 the United States Supreme Court held
that a union employee's retaliatory discharge claim is not preempted by section 301 unless the resolution of that claim requires
the interpretation of a just cause provision in the collective bargaining agreement."
The employee in Lingle was discharged after suffering a workrelated injury and requesting compensation pursuant to the Illinois
Workers' Compensation Act.4" The employer maintained that it
discharged the employee for filing a false workers' compensation
claim. 42 The employee's union filed a grievance on the employee's
behalf, contending that her discharge violated the just cause provision of the employee's union contract.4 3 While the arbitration was
proceeding, the employee filed suit in an Illinois circuit court, alleging that she was discharged in retaliation for exercising her
rights under the Workers' Compensation Act."4 The employer removed the case to the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Illinois on the basis of diversity of citizenship, and then it
filed a motion to dismiss.45 The district court dismissed the action,
ruling that the state tort claim was preempted because it was "inextricably intertwined"
with the union contract's just cause
6
provision.1
47
The employee then appealed the decision of the district court.
She argued that the tort action was independent of the collective
bargaining agreement provisions because the tort claim could be
just cause. Lingle, 823 F.2d at 1046. In reaching this holding, the Lingle court concluded that retaliation cases necessarily involve interpretation of collective bargaining
agreement just cause provisions. Id. According to the Seventh Circuit, allowing state
tort claims would frustrate public policy favoring the development of uniform federal law
in this area and public policy favoring employment dispute resolution by arbitration. Id.
Therefore, the court held that the state retaliation claims were preempted. Id.
39. 108 S. Ct. 1877 (1988).
40. Id. at 1885.
41. Id. at 1879. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, paras. 138.1-138.30 (1987).
42. Lingle, 108 S. Ct. at 1879.
43. Id. Pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement, the grievance was submitted
to arbitration and the arbitrator ruled in favor of the employee. Id. The arbitrator ordered the employer to reinstate the employee with full back pay. Id.
44. Id. The employee filed suit in the Illinois Circuit Court for Williamson County.
Id.
45. Id.
46. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 1448, 1449 (S.D. Ill.
1985). The court reasoned that allowing a union employee to bring a state retaliatory
discharge claim would undermine the terms of the labor contract, which provided for
arbitration of employee grievances. Id.
47. See Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, 823 F.2d 1031, 1046 (7th Cir. 1987).
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resolved without interpreting the agreement.48 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in an en banc opinion,
rejected this argument and affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. 49 The court reasoned that the retaliatory discharge claim
involved an analysis of the same facts that would be considered in
deciding whether an employee had been discharged without just
cause. 50 Hence, the court held that section 301 preempted the state
retaliatory discharge claim." This holding placed the Seventh Circuit in conflict with other federal circuits that have held that5 2section 301 does not preempt state retaliatory discharge claims.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict
among the circuits on the preemption issue. 3 The Court began its
analysis by tracing its prior decisions in this area.5 4 The Lingle
Court noted that in Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills,55 it previously held that section 301 not only provides federal jurisdiction
over union contract disputes, but also authorizes federal courts to
develop a body of federal common law for enforcing union contracts. 6 The Lingle Court further noted that in Teamsters Local v.
Lucas Flour Co. , it rejected applying state rules of contract interpretation when interpreting a collective bargaining agreement.5"
The Lucas Flour Court ruled that section 301 required resort to
federal law to ensure uniform interpretation of union contracts and
to provide consistent resolution of labor disputes.5 9 Finally, the
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1033.
50. Id. at 1046.
51. Id. The court reasoned that Congress intended to make grievance and arbitration
procedures the exclusive remedy for alleged violations of union contract provisions. Id.
(citing Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 210-11 (1985)).
52. See Baldracchi v. Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Div., 814 F.2d 102, 107 (2d Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2819 (1988); Herring v. Prince Macaroni, Inc., 799 F.2d
120, 124 n.2 (3d Cir. 1986). See also Peabody Gallion v. Dollar, 666 F.2d 1309, 1316-19
(10th Cir. 1981) (retaliatory discharge claim not preempted by National Labor Relations
Act). But see Johnson v. Hussman Corp., 805 F.2d 795, 797 (8th Cir. 1986) (retaliatory
discharge claim preempted by section 301). The appellate court holding in Lingle also
resulted in a conflict between the Seventh Circuit and the Illinois Supreme Court on this
issue. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
53. Lingle, 108 S. Ct. at 1879-80.
54. Id. at 1880-81.
55. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
56. Lingle, 108 S. Ct at 1880 (citing Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 451). In Lincoln Mills,
the Supreme Court held that a district court had the authority under section 301 to compel grievance arbitration between a union and an employer. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at
449-56.
57. 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
58. Lingle, 108 S. Ct. at 1880 (citing Lucas Flour, 369 U.S. at 102-04).
59. 1d. (citing Lucas Flour, 369 U.S. at 103-04). In Lucas Flour, the Supreme Court
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Lingle Court noted that in Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 60 it ruled
that section 301 preempted a state tort action for bad faith handling of an insurance claim because the labor contract specified the
method by which benefit claims would be handled.61 In reaching
this conclusion, the Lueck Court reasoned that the state claim necessarily depended on the meaning of the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement. 62 The Lueck Court emphasized that when
the resolution of a state claim requires the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement, the state claim is preempted and federal labor law principles must be applied.63
Applying these preemption principles, the Lingle Court rejected
the Seventh Circuit analysis that preemption occurs whenever a
state claim implicates the same factual analysis as an inquiry under
64
the just cause provision of a collective bargaining agreement.
The Court stated that the purpose behind section 301 preemption
is to ensure that federal law will be applied in disputes that involve
the interpretation of labor agreements. 65 Thus, even when the state
law claim and the grievance under the labor contract involve the
same set of facts, there is no preemption as long as the state law
claim can be resolved without interpreting the contract itself.66
The Court noted that the elements required to prove the Illinois
retaliatory discharge claim involved purely factual questions that
did not require an interpretation of collective bargaining agreement
terms.6 7 Therefore, the Lingle Court held that the state retaliatory
discharge claim was not preempted by section 301.68
The Supreme Court in Lingle reaffirmed that substantive state
held that state courts must apply federal common law in interpreting whether a collective
bargaining agreement implicitly prohibited a union strike. Lucas Flour, 369 U.S. at 103.
The Lucas Flour Court stated that federal law should apply to avoid the disruptive effect
of divergent state and federal rules on contract interpretation. Id. at 104. The Court also
emphasized that allowing the development of divergent federal and state law would frustrate the federal policy of promoting industrial peace. Id.
60. 471 U.S. 202 (1985).
61. Lingle, 108 S. Ct. at 1881 (citing Lueck, 471 U.S. at 218).
62. Id. (citing Lueck, 471 U.S. at 218-19).
63. Id. (citing Lueck, 471 U.S. at 218-19).
64. Id. at 1883.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1882. For a list of the elements of a retaliatory discharge claim, see supra
note 7 and accompanying text.
68. Lingle, 108 S. Ct. at 1882. The Court noted that a retaliatory discharge claim
ordinarily will not be preempted. Id. at 1885. The Court acknowledged that union contract terms may be useful to determine separate issues, such as the amount of damages,
and that, with respect to these separate issues, federal law may apply in interpreting the
contract. Id. at 1885 n.12.
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law rights in the labor relations context can co-exist with federal
labor policy. At a time when many state courts, including those in
Illinois, are creating new rights and causes of action for workers,69
the Lingle decision ensures that employees covered by union contracts will share the benefits of these judicially-created rights. In
many instances, the Lingle decision may provide unionized workers with multiple forums in which to challenge terminations.7 " As
the Supreme Court noted, however, such alternative remedies already exist for union employees who claim unlawful discrimination. 7 ' The Lingle decision makes clear that as long as an
employee can assert a state claim that is independent of the terms
of the collective bargaining agreement, the state claim will not be
preempted by federal labor law.
B.

Contract Claims

In 1987, the Illinois Supreme Court in Duldulao v. St. Mary of
Nazareth Hospital72 held that an employee handbook or other policy statement of job security may rebut the presumption of at-will
employment. 73 In effect, the Duldulao court found that a handbook or other policy statement may create a binding contract between employer and employee when it clearly communicates a
promise. 74 During the Survey year, three Illinois appellate court
69. See, e.g., Hinthorn v. Roland's of Bloomington, Inc., 119 Ill. 2d 526, 519 N.E.2d
909 (1988). The Hinthorn decision expanded the scope of retaliatory discharge in Illinois
to include claims by employees who allege that they were fired for orally requesting medical attention for work-related injuries, even though they had not yet filed workers' compensation claims. Id. at 534-35, 519 N.E.2d at 913-14. For a discussion of the Hinthorn
decision, see supra notes 7-34 and accompanying text.
70. In addition to having a choice of forums for a suit involving wrongful termination, a union employee who arbitrates a grievance and loses is not collaterally estopped
from bringing a subsequent retaliatory discharge claim against his employer. Ryherd v.
General Cable Co., 124 Ill. 2d 418, 434, 530 N.E.2d 431, 438 (1988). The Ryherd court
reasoned that a retaliatory discharge claim involves an inquiry into state public policy,
which a privately-appointed arbitrator is neither competent nor authorized to perform.
Id. at 431, 530 N.E.2d at 437. Hence, the court concluded that section 301 grievances
and retaliatory discharge claims are "different and fundamentally unrelated." Id. at 432,
530 N.E.2d at 438.
71. Lingle, 108 S. Ct. at 1885.
72. 115 Ill. 2d 482, 505 N.E.2d 314 (1987).
73. Id. at 489, 505 N.E.2d at 318. Generally, "an employment relationship without a
fixed duration is terminable at the will of either party." Id. at 489, 505 N.E.2d at 317.
However, the fact that an employment relationship is without a fixed duration creates
only the presumption of at-will employment. Id. at 489, 505 N.E.2d at 318. A litigant
may overcome the at-will presumption by showing that the employer and employee contracted otherwise. Id.
74. Id. In Duldulao, the court considered whether an employee hired for an indefinite term was nonetheless a party to an employment contract comprised of terms set forth
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decisions"5 construed Duldulao narrowly, 6 while two federal court
courts gave the case a broader application. 7
The Illinois Appellate Courts' reluctance to extend Duldulao is
evident in the three decisions rendered in this Survey year.7 In all
of these cases, the court refused to allow employee handbooks or
policy statements to create or modify employment contracts.
In two of the appellate court decisions, the courts declined to
find employment contracts because the alleged promises were insufficient to create binding agreements. In Crenshaw v. De Vry,
Inc. ,9 the Illinois Appellate Court for the First District held that a
company's policy statement, which provided that an employee who
failed to meet certain productivity standards could be placed on
in an employee handbook. Id. at 484, 505 N.E.2d at 315. The employee claimed that the
employer had breached an implied contract when it discharged the employee without
following termination procedures set forth in its employee handbook. Id. at 485, 505
N.E.2d at 315. The Duldulao court held that under certain circumstances, an employee
handbook or an employer's policy statement may create a binding employment contract.
Id. at 487-90, 505 N.E.2d at 317-18.
The court stated that when traditional elements of contract formation are present, provisions contained in an employee handbook or policy statement may constitute an enforceable employment contract. Id. at 490, 505 N.E.2d at 318. In order to constitute an
employment contract, the language contained in a policy manual or handbook must
clearly communicate a promise, the employee must be aware of the promise and reasonably believe it to be an offer, and the employee must accept the offer by continuing to
work. Id. The Duldulao court then concluded that the employee handbook created a
contract, the terms of which were breached when the employee was discharged in violation of termination procedures set forth in the handbook. Id. at 490-494, 505 N.E.2d at
318-20.
For a detailed discussion of the Duldulao decision, see Alper & Dalenberg, Labor Law,
19 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 591, 592-97 (1987).
75. Crenshaw v. DeVry, Inc., 172 Ill. App. 3d 228, 526 N.E.2d 474 (1st Dist. 1988);
Levitt v. Gorris, 167 Ill. App. 3d 88, 520 N.E.2d 1169 (1st Dist. 1988); McWhorter v.
Realty World-Star, Inc., 171 Ill. App. 3d 588, 525 N.E.2d 1205 (5th Dist. 1988).
76. Several appellate cases immediately following the Duldulao decision applied the
doctrine favorably to employees and found employment contracts. See Land v. Michael
Reese Hosp., 153 Ill. App. 3d 465, 468-69, 505 N.E.2d 1261, 1263 (1st Dist. 1987) (a
binding contract existed when employee manual outlined employee grievance procedures); DeFosse v. Cherry Elec. Prod. Corp., 156 Ill. App. 3d 1030, 1035, 510 N.E.2d
141, 145 (2d Dist. 1987) (employee had contractual right to benefits outlined in employee
benefits pamphlet). However, another case held that an employer may avoid contractual
obligations by placing disclaimers in employee manuals and publications. Moore v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 155 Ill. App. 3d 781, 784-85, 508 N.E.2d 519, 521 (2d Dist.), leave to
appeal denied, 116 Ill. 2d 562, 515 N.E.2d 112 (1987).
77. Kula v. J.K. Schofield & Co., 668 F. Supp. 1126 (N.D. Ill. 1987); Belfatto v.
Robert Bosch Corp., No. 86-C-6632 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 15, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library,
Dist file).
78. Crenshaw v. DeVry, Inc., 172 Ill. App. 3d 228, 526 N.E.2d 474 (1st Dist. 1988);
Levitt v. Gorris, 167 Ill. App. 3d 88, 520 N.E.2d 1169 (1st Dist. 1988); McWhorter v.
Realty World-Star, Inc., 171 Ill. App. 3d 588, 525 N.E.2d 1205 (5th Dist. 1988).
79. 172 Il. App. 3d 228, 526 N.E.2d 474 (1st Dist. 1988).
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probation, did not create an employment contract.80 The employee
in Crenshaw claimed that he was entitled to be placed on probation
before he could be terminated."1 The employee based this argument upon a written policy statement which provided that the failure to meet certain productivity standards was "cause for
placement on probation. '8 2 The employee also presented evidence
that other employees were placed on probation when their performance was unsatisfactory. 83 Additionally, the employee relied
upon a provision in the company's regional manager guidelines
that mandated probation. 4
The court held that the policy manual provision did not create a
contract. 85 The court found that the probation provision contained
in the written policy statement was discretionary.8 6 In reaching
this conclusion, the court noted that the policy manual did not
contain any language such as "must" or "will" that would mandate probation.8 7 Additionally, the court found that the employer's supervisory guidelines for its regional managers were
irrelevant in construing an employment contract between an employer and an employee.8 8
Similarly, in Levitt v. Gorris, 9 the Illinois Appellate Court for
the First District dismissed a discharged employee's breach of contract claim because the court found that the employer had not
made a clear promise of continued employment.90 The employee
in Levitt was a discharged probationary police officer.9 1 Under the
Illinois Municipal Code, 9 2 police officers are initially hired for a
80. Id. at 231, 526 N.E.2d at 476-77.
81. Id. at 230, 526 N.E.2d at 476.
82. Id. at 229, 526 N.E.2d at 475. The employee had a contract with the employer
that incorporated by reference the extrinsic written policy statement on which the employee in this case relied. Id. at 231, 526 N.E.2d at 476. The contract also provided that
either party could terminate the employment at any time with or without written notice.
Id. at 229, 526 N.E.2d at 475.
83. Id. at 231, 526 N.E.2d at 476.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 231, 526 N.E.2d at 476-77. The court held, alternatively, that the employee
terminated the contract and thereby waived any alleged right to protection. Id. at 23031, 526 N.E.2d at 476.
86. Id. at 231, 526 N.E.2d at 476-77.
87. Id. at 231, 526 N.E.2d at 477.
88. Id.
89. 167 Ill. App. 3d 88, 520 N.E.2d at 1169 (1st Dist. 1988).
90. Id. at 92, 520 N.E.2d at 1171.
91. Id. at 89, 520 N.E.2d at 1169.
92. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, paras. 1-1-1 to 11-152-4 (1987).
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probationary period.93 During this probationary period, police departments may terminate their officers at will. 94 In Levitt, the pro-

bationer relied upon a written police department rule which
provided that probationary employees would be discharged if their
services were unsatisfactory. 95 Citing Duldulao, the employee
claimed that the rule created an employment contract and that she
was terminated in violation of the contract because she rendered
satisfactory services. 96 The employee argued that under Duldulao,
the department rule guaranteed her continued employment,
notwithstanding her probationary status under the Municipal
Code.97 The Levitt court disagreed and held that the rule did not
make any specific promise that would override the Municipal Code
provision. 98 The court noted that the legislature required the promulgation of such rules and did not intend to create private contractual rights for public sector employees. 99
In Mc Whorter v. Realty World-Star, Inc., 10 the third decision to
interpret Duldulao, the Illinois Appellate Court for the Fifth District refused to enforce provisions of an employee handbook when
an express employment contract contained contrary terms. 1 ' In
Mc Whorter, a discharged real estate sales agent sued to recover
unpaid sales commissions for properties that he listed but that were
not sold until after his employment terminated.10 2 The employee
relied upon the parties' "Independent Contractors Agreement,"
which provided that the employee would earn commissions on any
93. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, para. 10-2.1-17 (1987). Paragraph 10-2.1-17 provides
that "original appointments... shall be on probation." Id.
94. Levitt, 167 Ill. App. 3d at 91, 520 N.E.2d at 1170 (citing Kapsalis v. Board of Fire
& Police Comm'rs, 143 Ill. App. 3d 465, 468, 493 N.E.2d 56, 58 (1st Dist. 1986)).
95. Id. at 90, 520 N.E.2d at 1170.

96.
97.
98.
99.

Id.
Id. at 91, 520 N.E.2d at 1170.
Id. at 92, 520 N.E.2d at 1171.
Id. The court stated that the legislature required the police department to make

rules relating to appointment and removal of its employees. Id. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
24, para. 10-2.1-5 (1987). Paragraph 10-2.1-5 provides that:
The board, by its rules, shall provide for promotion in the police and fire departments .... [T]he rules governing [promotion] shall be the same as provided for
applicants for original appointment, except that original appointments only
shall be on probation as provided by the rules.
Id. The court also stated that "[it is well settled that legislative acts fixing the terms or
tenure of employment of public employees do not create private contractual rights." Levitt, 167 Ill. App. 3d at 92, 520 N.E.2d at 1171 (citing Dodge v. Board of Educ., 302 U.S.
74 (1937)).
100. 171 Ill. App. 3d 588, 525 N.E.2d 1205 (5th Dist. 1988).
101. Id. at 593-94, 525 N.E.2d at 1208.
102. Id. at 590, 525 N.E.2d at 1206.
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listings that he obtained.'03 The agreement also provided that termination of the contract would not divest the employee of commissions that accrued to him prior to termination. 10 4 The employer
claimed that an employee policy manual provision was incorporated into the agreement. 5 The policy manual stated that commissions were payable to terminated sales employees only if the
employee completed a sale before he was terminated. I0I The court
rejected the employer's argument, holding that when policy manual provisions are inconsistent with unambiguous provisions contained in a written employment contract, the07policy manual may
not override or modify the existing contract. 1
Thus, the Illinois appellate courts have been reluctant to afford
Duldulao a broad reading. The courts have emphasized that in
order to create an employment contract, policy manual provisions
must be nondiscretionary l s and explicit." °9 The courts have further required that employment contracts comprised of policy manual provisions must comport with traditional contract law
103. Id. at 589-90, 525 N.E.2d at 1206.
104. Id. at 590, 525 N.E.2d at 1206.
105. Id. at 590-91, 525 N.E.2d at 1206-07.
106. Id. The court noted that the provisions of the policy manual were incorporated
into the written agreement only insofar as they related to "the handling of [the] salesperson's service as a salesperson ... the means of securing listings, handling prospects, and
consummating negotiations." Id. at 590, 525 N.E.2d at 1206. The employer also claimed
that the language of the sales commissions section of the written contract was ambiguous
and that the policy manual must be incorporated as a clarification. Id. at 591, 525
N.E.2d at 1207. Alternatively, the employer argued that the entire policy manual was
incorporated by reference into the agreement. Id. Additionally, the employer argued
that under Duldulao, the policy manual was part of the employment contract and that, if
its terms conflicted with terms contained in the written agreement, then the more specific
terms of the manual should control. Id.
107. Id. at.593-94, 525 N.E.2d at 1208. The court also concluded that the policy
manual was not incorporated in its entirety into the independent contractor agreement.
Id. at 592-93, 525 N.E.2d at 1207.
The McWhorter decision is consistent with the basic contract law principle that prior
or contemporaneous extrinsic agreements may not modify existing contracts that are
clear and unambiguous in their terms. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 213 (1979). Hence, the McWhorter decision underscores the degree to which the
Duldulao decision was grounded in contract law principles. The McWhorter decision
advises employees that if they are covered by an unambiguous written employment contract, then Duldulao will not allow an allegedly co-existent contract to modify the existing agreement. The Mc Whorter decision is helpful for employers who may wish to
limit contractual liability to their employees by entering into agreements that delineate
the specific terms of the employment relationship. In such instances, the McWhorter
decision suggests that the agreement may not expand the contract to include inconsistent
terms of alleged contracts.
108. See supra notes 79-88 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 89-99 and accompanying text.
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principles.110
Unlike the state appellate courts, the federal courts have construed the Duldulao decision broadly."' In Kula v. J.K Schofield
& Co.,

112

the United States District Court for the Northern District

of Illinois construed Duldulao as allowing an oral promise to create a permanent employment contract." 13 Additionally, in Belfatto
v. Robert Bosch Corp.,

14

the Northern District of Illinois limited

the applicability of contractual disclaimers to those instances when
the disclaimer is prominently displayed in the employee handbook.'
If the federal courts continue to construe Duldulao
broadly, then the Illinois Supreme Court may need to reconcile the
divergent trends.
III.

DISCLOSURE OF PERSONNEL FILES

Chapter 48, paragraph 2002 of the Illinois Revised Statutes (the
"Personnel File Act") 16 provides that an employer must permit its
employees to inspect the contents of their personnel files. 7 Prior
110. See supra notes 100-07 and accompanying text.
S111.See Kula v. J.K. Schofield & Co., 668 F. Supp. 1126 (N.D. Ill. 1987); Belfatto v.
Robert Bosch Corp., No. 86-C-6632 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 15, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library,
Dist file).
112. 668 F. Supp. 1126 (N.D. Ill. 1987)
113. Id. at 1130-31 The Kula court cited two Illinois First District Appellate Court
cases for the proposition that oral employment contracts are enforceable in Illinois. Id. at
1130 (citing Ladesic v. Servomation Corp., 140 Ill. App. 3d 489, 488 N.E.2d 1355 (1st
Dist. 1986) (oral employment contracts enforceable if parties' intent as to duration is
clear and if contract supported by adequate consideration); Martin v. Federal Life Ins.
Co., 109 Ill. App. 3d 596, 440 N.E.2d 998 (1st Dist. 1982)).
114. No. 86-C-6632 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 15, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
115. Id. The court stated that for purposes of withstanding a motion to dismiss an
employee's contract claim, a disclaimer, which appeared at the end of an employee handbook and that was not sufficiently likely to capture a reader's attention, did not bar incorporation of the handbook's provisions into an implied employment contract. Id. Cf.
Morgan v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 44 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 704, 705 (N.D. Ill.
1987) (three explicit disclaimers in a policy manual were sufficient to negate employee's
contract claim that the employer made a promise of continued employment and that the
employee was reasonable in believing that a promise was made); Moore v. Illinois Bell
Tel. Co., 155 Ill. App. 3d 781, 784-85, 508 N.E.2d 519, 521 (2d Dist.), leave to appeal
denied, 116 Ill. 2d 562, 515 N.E.2d 112 (1987) (employer may avoid contractual obligations by placing disclaimers in employee manuals and publications).
116. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, paras. 2001-2012 (1987) (amended 1988). The Personnel File Act is entitled "An Act to permit employees to review personnel records; to
provide criteria for their review; to prescribe the information which may be contained in
personnel records; and to provide penalties." Id.
117. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 2002 (1987). Section 2 of the statute provides in
pertinent part:
Every employer shall... permit the employee to inspect any personnel documents which are, have been or are intended to be used in determining that em-
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to September 1988, the Personnel File Act also provided that an
employer need not disclose documents that are used in management planning."' In Spinelli v. Immanuel Lutheran Evangelical
Congregation,"9 the Illinois Supreme Court struck down the Personnel File Act, holding that the statute was unconstitutionally
vague. 120 The Illinois Legislature subsequently amended the Per1 21
sonnel File Act in an attempt to cure the vagueness.
The Spinelli decision arose out of two cases that were consolidated on appeal.122 In one case, a terminated private school
teacher sought disclosure of letters that were contained in her personnel file and upon which the school board relied when it decided
not to renew her contract. 123 The school refused to allow the
teacher to inspect the letters because it had assured the parents and
ployee's qualifications for employment, promotion, transfer, additional
compensation, discharge or other disciplinary action, except as provided in Section 10.
Id.
118. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 2010 (1987). Section 10 provided in pertinent
part:
The right of the employee or the employee's designated representative to inspect
his or her personnel records does not apply to:
(a) Letters of reference for that employee.
(c) Materials used by the employer for management planning, including but
not limited to judgments, external peer review documents or recommendations
concerning future salary increases and other wage treatments, management bonus plans, promotions and job assignments or other comments or ratings used
for the employer's planning purposes.
Id.
119.
118 Ill. 2d 389, 515 N.E.2d 1222 (1987).
120. Id. at 403, 515 N.E.2d at 1228.
121. See 1988 Ill. Legis. Serv. No. 85-1393 (effective September 2, 1988) (to be codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 2010(c)). Public Act 85-1393 amended section 10 of
the Personnel File Act, which now provides:
(c) Materials relating to the employer's staff planning, such as matters relating
to the business' development, expansion, closing or operational goals, where the
materials relate to or affect more than one employee, provided, however, that
this exception does not apply if such materials are, have been or are intended to
be used by the employer in determining the individual employee's qualifications
for employment, promotion, transfer, or additional compensation, or in determining the employee's discharge or discipline.
Id.
122. Spinelli, 118 Ill. 2d at 395, 515 N.E.2d at 1225. See Spinelli v. Immanuel Lutheran Evangelical Congregation, Inc., 144 111. App. 3d 325, 494 N.E.2d 196 (2d Dist.
1986), aff'd, 118 Ill. 2d 389, 515 N.E.2d 1222 (1987); Kamrath v. Board of Educ., No.
85-L-275 (Cir. Ct. Oct. 27, 1987), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 118 Ill. 2d 389, 515 N.E.2d
1222 (1987).
123. Spinelli, 118 Ill. 2d at 396, 515 N.E.2d at 1225. After her employer failed to
renew her employment contract, the private school teacher brought an action to compel
disclosure of letters from parents and teachers that were contained in her personnel file
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teachers who wrote the letters that it would hold them in strict
confidence.124 The school also claimed that it used the letters for
management planning purposes and that, therefore, the letters
were exempt from disclosure under the Personnel File Act.125 Alternatively, the school argued that the Act violated due process
because the Act's vague language prevented employers from deter26
mining which documents they could withhold from disclosure.
In the other consolidated case, a public school teacher claimed
that a local school board violated the Personnel File Act when it
denied his request for written statements that the school board
considered in the teacher's suspension hearings.' 27 The teacher
brought an action against the school board, challenging the validity of his suspension. 12 The Attorney General intervened in both
cases, arguing that the Personnel File Act was not unconstitutionally vague and, therefore, did not violate due process. 12 9 The Attorney General argued that the meaning of the statutory exemption
for documents used in management planning was generally understood by employers. 30 The constitutional issue in this consoliand upon which her employer based its decision not to rehire her. Id. at 395-96, 515
N.E.2d at 1225.
124. Id. at 396, 515 N.E.2d at 1225.
125. Id.
126. Id. The trial court ordered the school to disclose the letters, but the appellate
court held that the Personnel File Act violated the due process rights of the employer
because it was unconstitutionally vague. Id.
127. Id. at 394, 515 N.E.2d at 1224. The public school teacher was temporarily suspended for using profanity in the classroom. Id. at 397, 515 N.E.2d at 1226. At a suspension hearing, the school administration introduced into evidence written statements
made by students that described the teacher's classroom behavior. Id. at 397-98, 515
N.E.2d at 1225-26. The teacher sought to invalidate his suspension in circuit court,
claiming that under the statute, the school board should have allowed the teacher to
obtain copies of the statements prior to his suspension hearing. Id. at 394-98, 515 N.E.2d
at 1225-26.
The discharged school teacher also claimed that the school board had no authority to
suspend him for disciplinary reasons. Id. at 403, 515 N.E.2d at 1228-29. Alternatively,
the teacher argued that if the school board did have such authority, then the teacher was
entitled to a hearing as provided in the School Code for teacher removal and dismissal.
Id. at 394, 405, 515 N.E.2d at 1224, 1229. For an analysis of this claim, see infra notes
180-96 and accompanying text.
128. Spinelli, 118 Ill. 2d at 394, 515 N.E.2d at 1224.
129. Id. at 394-95, 401, 515 N.E.2d at 1224, 1227.
130. Id. at 401, 515 N.E.2d at 1227. The Attorney General also argued that in the
case of the public school teacher, the appellate court did not have to rule on the constitutionality of the statute because the letters contained in the teacher's file were letters of
reference, which were exempt from coverage by the statute. Id. at 399, 515 N.E.2d at
1226. See supra note 118. The Illinois Supreme Court did not consider this alternative
ground for decision because the Attorney General did not adequately brief the issue.
Spinelli, 118 Ill. 2d at 401, 515 N.E.2d at 1227.
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dated appeal was whether the Personnel File Act violated due
process because it was unconstitutionally vague.'
In resolving
this issue, the Illinois Supreme Court noted that two sections of the
Personnel File Act were in conflict as to which documents the employer must disclose. 3 2 Section 2 of the statute grants an employee
the right to inspect documents that his employer used in making
personnel decisions with respect to that employee, including decisions to promote, transfer, or discipline the employee. 33 Section
10(c) of the statute, however, allowed employers to deny employees access to "management planning" materials, some of which
also could be used in determining whether the employee is promoted, transferred, or disciplined.'
As a result of this conflict,
the court concluded that employers could not ascertain with reasonable certainty which documents they must disclose. 35 Therefore, the court held that the statute violated
the due process rights
36
of employers and was unconstitutional.

In response to the Spinelli decision, the Illinois Legislature
amended section 10 of the Personnel File Act

31

to cure the vague-

ness of the prior statute. The amended section 10 retains the exception for "planning" materials, but limits that exception to "staff
planning" documents that relate to "[business] development, expansion, closing or operational goals where the materials relate to
or affect more than one employee."' 3 Additionally, the amended
section provides that the exception does not apply where the planning materials are otherwise subject to inspection under section 2
131. Id.
132. Id. at 401-03, 515 N.E.2d at 1227-28. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 2002
(1987); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 2010(c) (1987). For the text of these provisions, see
supra notes 117-18.
133. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 2002 (1987). The court stated that the letters
contained in the private school teacher's file were used to determine the teacher's qualifications for continued employment and were, therefore, subject to disclosure under the
statute. Spinelli, 118 Ill. 2d at 401, 515 N.E.2d at 1227-28.
134. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 2010(c) (1987). The court recognized that an
employer might reasonably conclude that the letters were used for management planning,
thus rendering the letters exempt from disclosure. Spinelli, 118 Ill. 2d at 401-02, 515
N.E.2d at 1228.
135. Spinelli, 118 Ill. 2d at 401-03, 515 N.E.2d at 1227-28. The court reasoned that
an employer of ordinary intelligence would not be able to determine with reasonable
certainty which personnel documents are subject to disclosure. Id. at 403, 515 N.E.2d at
1228.
136. Id.
137. See 1988 Ill. Legis. Serv. No. 85-1393 (effective September 2, 1988) (to be codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 2010(c)). For the text of the amended provision, see
supra note 121.
138. See 1988 I11.
Legis. Serv. No. 85-1393 (effective September 2, 1988) (to be codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 2010(c)).
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of the Personnel File Act.1 a9 By providing a more limited exception for business planning materials, the amended Personnel File
Act enlarges the inspection rights of employees.
IV.

A.

THE PUBLIC SECTOR

Illinois Public Labor Relations Act

Under the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act ("IPLRA"),' 4"
unions and public employers must bargain collectively over conditions of employment that are not otherwise regulated or prohibited
by law.141 In City of Decatur v. American Federation,41 2 the Illinois
Supreme Court held that a municipality that adopts the civil service provisions of the Illinois Municipal Code ("Municipal
Code")

43

must bargain over a proposal for binding arbitration of

disputes involving employee terminations or suspensions. 44
139. Id.
140. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, paras. 1601-1627 (1987).
141. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 1607 (1987). Section 7 of the IPLRA provides in
pertinent part:
A public employer and the exclusive representative have the authority and duty
to bargain collectively [as] set forth in this Section ... with respect to wages,
hours and other conditions of employment. For the purposes of this Act, 'to
bargain collectively' [includes negotiation] in good faith with respect to wages,
The duty 'to bargain collechours and other conditions of employment ....
tively' shall also include an obligation to negotiate over any matter with respect
to wages, hours and other conditions of employment, not specifically provided
for in any other law or not specifically in violation of the provisions of any law
....
If any law pertains, in part, to a matter affecting the wages, hours and
other conditions of employment, such other law shall not be construed as limiting the duty 'to bargain collectively' and to enter into collective bargaining
agreements containing clauses which either supplement, implement, or relate to
the effect of such provisions in other laws.
Id.
142. 122 I11.2d 353, 522 N.E.2d 1219 (1988).
143. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, paras. 10-1-1 to 10-1-48 (1987). In Illinois, a city may
choose to adopt a civil service system that incorporates the civil service provisions of the
Illinois Municipal Code. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, para. 10-1-43 (1987). The Municipal
Code provides for investigations and hearings regarding municipal employee terminations and suspensions. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, para. 10-1-18 (1987). Section 10-1-18(a)
provides in pertinent part:
[N]o officer or employee of the classified civil service of any municipality ...
may be removed or discharged, or suspended for a period of more than 30 days,
except for cause upon written charges and after an opportunity to be heard in
his own defense. Such charges shall be investigated by or before the civil service
commission, or by or before some officer or board appointed by the commission
to conduct the investigation.
Id. The Municipal Code further provides that public employees suspended for more than
five days, or suspended within six months after a prior suspension, are entitled to a hearing before the civil service commission upon request. Id.
144. City of Decatur, 122 I11.2d at 356-57, 522 N.E.2d at 1220.
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In City of Decatur, the union representing a group of municipal
employees claimed that the city refused to bargain over employment conditions as required by the IPLRA. 45 Specifically, the
union sought a provision that would require the city to arbitrate
employee grievances, including grievances related to disciplinary
terminations and suspensions.116 The city's civil service system incorporated the termination and suspension provisions of the Municipal Code.147 The Municipal Code empowers city civil service
commissions to conduct investigations and hearings regarding municipal employee terminations and suspensions.14 The city argued, therefore, that the IPLRA did not mandate collective
bargaining because the Municipal Code provisions constituted
149
matters that were provided for in other laws.
The Illinois Supreme Court rejected the city's argument and
held that the city must bargain collectively over the arbitration issue. 10 The court noted that the legislature did not intend that statutes and local ordinances that merely relate to matters of public
employment should constrain the broad duty to bargain under the
IPLRA. 5 ' The court noted that the IPLRA distinguishes between
145. Id. As a result of the city's refusal to bargain over employment conditions, the
union filed a charge with the Illinois State Labor Relations Board ("Board"). Id. The
charge alleged that the city had committed an unfair labor practice. Id. The Board
ordered the city to bargain over the union's proposal. Id. at 357, 522 N.E.2d at 1220.
The Board stated that a correct reading of section 7 of the IPLRA require that laws that
pertain in part to matters affecting conditions of employment could not limit the duty to
bargain collectively. Id. at 360, 522 N.E.2d at 1221-22. The Board reasoned that the
civil service provisions affect conditions of employment. Id. Hence, the Board concluded
that the civil service provisions could not limit the duty to bargain. Id.
146. Id. at 363, 522 N.E.2d at 1223.
147. Id. at 357, 522 N.E.2d at 1220. The civil service system is optional and a city
adopting the system may unilaterally alter the terms of the adopted Municipal Code provisions. Id. at 365, 522 N.E.2d at 1224.
148. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 24, para. 10-1-18 (1987). For the text of this provision, see
supra note 143.
149. City of Decatur, 122 I11.2d at 359, 522 N.E.2d at 1221. The appellate court
agreed with the city. See Decatur v. Illinois State Labor Relations Bd., 149 Ill. App. 3d
319, 325-26, 500 N.E.2d 573, 577-78 (4th Dist. 1986). In reversing the Board's decision,
the appellate court held that the provisions of the Municipal Code adopted by the city
were matters provided for in other laws, thereby relieving the city of a duty to bargain.
Id.
150. City of Decatur, 122 Ill. 2d at 366, 522 N.E.2d at 1225.
151. Id. at 364, 522 N.E.2d at 1224. The court pointed to the policy of the IPLRA to
promote collective bargaining between public employees and their employers. Id. The
court noted that the Board's decision suggested that no law pertaining to conditions of
employment could ever limit the duty to bargain. Id. at 361, 522 N.E.2d at 1222. For a
discussion of the Board's reasoning, see supra note 145. The court agreed with the Board
that the city has a duty to bargain. City of Decatur, 122 Ill. 2d at 362, 522 N.E.2d at
1223. Nevertheless, the court disagreed with the Board's reasoning. Id. at 361-62, 522
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laws that specifically provide for or prohibit a matter that might
otherwise be subjects of mandatory bargaining and laws that pertain only in part to a mandatory bargaining subject.' 52 Laws that
merely pertain in part to bargaining subjects do not preclude collective bargaining over terms that supplement, implement, or relate
to the effect of the other law. 53 The court concluded that because
the civil service system is optional and the adopting municipality
may alter its terms, the union's proposal should be construed as
supplementing, implementing, or relating to the provisions of the
Municipal Code. '54 The court also emphasized that arbitration has
played a significant role in private sector labor law 55 and that the
Illinois Legislature has expressed a similar preference for arbitration in the IPLRA. 1 56 Therefore, the court held that the city's civil
service provision did not relieve the municipality of a duty to bargain over the union arbitration proposal.' 57
The Illinois Supreme Court's broad reading of the IPLRA in
City of Decatur suggests that the duty to bargain will not be limited
by other state and local laws unless such laws conflict with or prohibit the union proposal or unless the laws are clearly intended to
preempt the subject matter of the proposal. The court also has
followed the lead of the federal courts in favoring the grievance
arbitration process as the means for resolving labor disputes. To
the extent that public sector unions are able to negotiate successN.E.2d at 1222-23. The Illinois Supreme Court acknowledged that courts normally give
deference to administrative agencies' interpretations of the laws that they administer, but
the court exercised its right to reject the Board's interpretation of the IPLRA as erroneous. Id. at 361, 522 N.E.2d at 1222.
152. Id. at 361-62, 522 N.E.2d at 1222-23 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 1607
(1987) (for the text of this provision, see supra note 141)).
153. Id. at 362, 522 N.E.2d at 1222-23 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, para. 10-1-18
(1987)). As an example of the type of law that would not limit the duty to bargain, the
court pointed to a minimum wage statute. Id. at 365, 522 N.E.2d at 1224. When a
minimum wage statute exists, a union may seek to bargain over a wage higher than the
statutory limit. Id.
154. Id. at 365-66, 522 N.E.2d at 1224.
155. Id. at 366, 522 N.E.2d at 1224 (citing United Steelworkers v. American Manuf.
Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363
U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593
(1960)).
156. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 1608 (1987)).
157. Id. at 362-66, 522 N.E.2d at 1222-25. In support of its holding, the court noted
that other jurisdictions that have faced similar conflicts between public employee bargaining laws and municipal civil service systems have favored mandatory bargaining. Id. at
363-64, 522 N.E.2d at 1223 (citing City of Casselberry v. Orange County Police Benevolent Ass'n, 482 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 1986); Local 1383 of the Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters v.
City of Warren, 411 Mich. 642, 311 N.W.2d 702 (1981); AFSCME Council 75 v. Clackamas County, 69 Or. App. 488, 687 P.2d 1102 (1984)).
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fully grievance arbitration procedures in their labor agreements, it
can be anticipated that discipline and suspension issues will be contested under the collectively-bargained grievance system rather
than through the statutory civil service provisions.
B.

Illinois EducationalLabor Relations Act

The Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act ("IELRA") 158
mandates collective bargaining between school boards and teachers' unions and requires the resolution of grievance disputes
through binding arbitration. 59 Previous Illinois appellate courts
disagreed over whether circuit courts have jurisdiction to vacate or
enforce IELRA arbitration awards. 160 In Board of Education v.
Compton,16 1 the Illinois Supreme Court resolved this conflict and
held that the IELRA divests circuit courts of jurisdiction
to vacate
162
or enforce public education arbitration awards.
The employee in Compton, a non-tenured teacher, was allegedly
terminated in violation of a collective bargaining agreement between the teacher's union and the school board. 163 As required by
the agreement, the teacher and his union filed a grievance against
the school board and submitted the grievance to arbitration.16* After the arbitrator ruled against the school board, the school board
158. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, paras. 1701-1721 (1987).
159. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, paras. 1710(a), 1710(c) (1987). Section 10(a) of the
IELRA provides that "[a]n educational employer and the [union] have the authority and
duty to bargain collectively.., with respect to wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment, and to execute a written contract incorporating any agreement
reached by such obligation." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 1710(a) (1987). Section 10(c)
of the IELRA provides that "[t]he collective bargaining agreement negotiated between
[the union] and the educational employer shall contain a grievance resolution procedure
which shall apply to all employees in the unit and shall provide for binding arbitration of
disputes concerning the administration or interpretation of the agreement." ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 48, para. 1710(c) (1987).
160. Two appellate courts held that circuit courts have jurisdiction over educational
arbitration awards. See Board of Educ. v. Rockford Educ. Ass'n, 150 Ill. App. 3d 198,
501 N.E.2d 338 (2d Dist. 1986), leave to appeal denied, 114 Ill. 2d. 543, 508 N.E.2d 725
(1988); Board of Trustees v. Cook County College Teachers Union, Local 1600, 139 Ill.
App. 3d 617, 487 N.E.2d 956 (1st Dist. 1985). But see Chicago Bd. of Educ. v. Chicago
Teachers Union, 142 Ill. App. 3d 527, 491 N.E.2d 1259 (1st Dist. 1986) (circuit courts do
not have jurisdiction over educational arbitration awards).
161. 123 Ill. 2d 216, 526 N.E.2d 149 (1988).
162. Id. at 217, 526 N.E.2d at 150.
163. Id. at 218, 526 N.E.2d at 150. The collective bargaining agreement listed procedures for teacher evaluation and termination and provided for resolution of disputes arising out of the agreement by grievance arbitration. Id. The teacher claimed that the
school board dismissed him without following these procedures. Board of Educ. v.
Compton, 157 Ill. App. 3d 439, 441, 510 N.E.2d 508, 509 (4th Dist. 1987).
164. Compton, 123 Ill. 2d at 218, 526 N.E.2d at 150.
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filed a petition in the circuit court to vacate the arbitrator's
award. 165 The circuit court vacated the award, 166 but on appeal the
Illinois Appellate Court for the Fourth District reversed, holding
that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to enforce or vacate
IELRA arbitration awards.1 67 The appellate court held that the
Educational Labor Relations Board had exclusive original jurisdiction to review education arbitration awards. 168
On appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, the school board argued that although there is no IELRA provision for circuit court
review of arbitration decisions, the circuit court has jurisdiction
69
under common law to determine whether a dispute is arbitrable. 1
The school board also argued that if the circuit court did not have
jurisdiction, then in employer who believes that a dispute is inarbitrable would be required to pursue a lengthy appeal process before
it could obtain judicial review of a dispute's arbitrability.' 70 Additionally, the school board contended that an employer would be
required to commit an unfair labor practice by refusing to comply
with an arbitrator's7 1 decision in order to obtain review of the arbitrability question.
In resolving the issue, the court contrasted the IELRA with the
Illinois Public Labor Relations Act,7 2 which expressly incorpo173
rates the provisions of the Uniform Arbitration Act ("UAA").
165. Id. at 218, 526 N.E.2d at 150-51.
166. Id. at 218, 526 N.E.2d at 151.
167. Board of Educ. v. Compton, 157 Ill. App. 3d 439, 510 N.E.2d 508 (4th Dist.
1987).
168. Id. at 439, 510 N.E.2d at 508. Under the IELRA, refusal to comply with an
arbitrator's award constitutes an unfair labor practice. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, paras.
1714(a)(8), (b)(6) (1987). The Board makes the initial determination as to whether an
unfair labor practice has been committed. Compton, 123 Ill. 2d at 221, 526 N.E.2d at
152. Under the IELRA, the Board's ruling is reviewable by the Illinois appellate courts.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 1716(a) (1987).
2d at 221, 526 N.E.2d at 152.
169. Compton, 123 I11.
170. Id. at 224-25, 526 N.E.2d at 153.
171. Id. at 225, 526 N.E.2d at 153. The school board argued that in some instances,
it may not be possible to refuse to comply with an arbitrator's decision (e.g., when a
losing party is only denied a requested benefit). Id. at 224-25, 526 N.E.2d at 153-54. The
school board also claimed that there was something unseemly about forcing an employer
to commit an unfair labor practice in order to get review. Id.
172. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, paras. 1601-1627 (1987). The IELRA was adopted in
the same legislative session as the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act. Compton, 123 Ill.
2d at 221-22, 526 N.E.2d at 152. The court noted that together the statutes were intended to provide a comprehensive regulation of Illinois public sector bargaining. Id. at
221, 526 N.E.2d at 152.
173. Compton, 123 Ill. 2d at 222, 526 N.E.2d at 152 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48
para. 1607 (1987) (incorporating ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 10, paras. 102-123 (1987))). Section 8 of the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act provides that "[t]he grievance and arbi-
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The UAA allows circuit courts to review arbitration decisions. 74
The court noted that the legislature failed to incorporate the UAA
provisions into the IELRA.17' Therefore, the court concluded that
the legislature intended to divest the circuit courts of jurisdiction
to review any IELRA arbitration decision,176including whether a
dispute was properly subject to arbitration.
Although the court held that the Board had primary jurisdiction
to review arbitration awards, it acknowledged that disallowing circuit court review might force a school board to commit an unfair
labor practice in order to contest a dispute's arbitrability.'1 7 The
court noted, however, that the school board could file its own
claim alleging that the union committed an unfair labor practice by
attempting to arbitrate a matter that is not subject to arbitration. 171
Moreover, the court noted that under the National Labor Relations Act, a party seeking review of an arbitrability ruling is likewise required to commit an unfair labor practice. 179
In Compton, the Illinois Supreme Court sought to ensure that
the IELRA would be interpreted in a uniform manner. The court
was concerned that conflicting circuit court judgments and forum
shopping between the Board and the circuit courts would imperil
the uniformity that the IELRA sought to achieve. The court's detration provisions of any collective bargaining agreement shall be subject to the Illinois
'Uniform Arbitration Act.'" ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 1608 (1987).
174. Compton, 123 Ill. 2d at 222, 526 N.E.2d at 152 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 10,
paras. 102, 112, 114, 116 (1987)). Under the UAA, Illinois courts have jurisdiction over
the following proceedings: proceedings to compel or stay arbitration, ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 10, para. 102 (1987); proceedings to vacate an arbitration award, ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
10, para. 112 (1987); and proceedings to modify an arbitration award, ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 10, para. 113 (1987). The UAA defines "court" as "any circuit court of [the] State,"
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 10, para. 116 (1987), and provides that the court has authority to
enter judgment in conformity with the court's order, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 10, para. 114
(1987).
175. Compton, 123 Ill. 2d at 222, 526 N.E.2d at 152.
176. Id. In reaching this decision, the court implicitly rejected the school board's
argument that the court had common law jurisdiction to decide a dispute's arbitrability.
Id.
177. Id. at 224-25, 526 N.E.2d at 153.
178. Id. at 225, 526 N.E.2d at 154.
179. Id. Under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-188 (1982), the
only way a party can get review of a bargaining unit decision is by refusing to bargain,
thereby committing an unfair labor practice. Compton, 123 Ill. 2d at 225-26, 526 N.E.2d
at 154 (citing Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473 (1964)). The court also acknowledged the school board's argument that some arbitration decisions are not reviewable
because it is impossible to commit unfair labor practices based on them. Id. at 226, 526
N.E.2d at 154. See supra note 171. The court declined to decide that issue because those
facts were not presented in the case. Compton, 123 I11.
2d at 226, 526 N.E.2d at 154.
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cision, which provides for review only by the Board and the appellate courts, can be expected to further this goal.
C. School Code
The School Code provides specific procedures for the permanent
removal or dismissal of tenured school teachers, but it does not
expressly provide procedures for temporary suspensions. 180 The
School Code also grants school boards the authority to make governance rules for their school districts.18 1 In Spinelli v. Immanuel
Lutheran Evangelical Congregation,12 the Illinois Supreme Court
held that a school board's rule-making power authorizes the board
to impose temporary suspensions of tenured teachers.' 83 The
Spinelli court further held that in effecting a temporary suspension,
the school board is not required to follow the permanent dismissal
procedures set forth in the School
Code. Rather, it need only sat8 4
isfy due process requirements.1
In Spinelli, a tenured public school teacher was accused of using
vulgar language in the classroom. 185 After a hearing, the teacher
was suspended.' 86 The teacher claimed that the school board had
no express or implied power to suspend tenured teachers for disciplinary reasons. 87 Alternatively, the teacher contended that if the
school board had suspension authority, it should have provided
him with a formal hearing in accordance with school code procedures. 8 8 The school board claimed that it had the authority to
180. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, para. 24-12 (1987). Essentially, section 24-12 of the
School Code provides that before a tenured teacher may be discharged for reasons other
than a reduction in force, the teacher must receive written notice of the charge and must
be provided with an opportunity for a hearing. Id.
181. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, para. 10-20.5 (1987). Section 10-20.5 of the School
Code provides that a school board has the power "[t]o adopt and enforce all necessary
rules for the management and government of the public schools of their district." Id.
182. 118 Ill. 2d 389, 515 N.E.2d 1222 (1987).
183. Id. at 404-05, 515 N.E.2d at 1229.
184. Id. at 403-07, 515 N.E.2d at 1228-30. The court also addressed the constitutionality of "An Act to permit employees to review personnel records." ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
48, paras. 2001-2012 (1987). Spinelli, 118 I11. 2d at 395, 515 N.E.2d at 1224-28. This
statute provides for disclosure of personnel files relative to the public school teacher's
claim. Id. For a discussion of this aspect of the case, see supra notes 116-39 and accompanying text.
185. Spinelli, 118 Ill. 2d at 397, 515 N.E.2d at 1225-26.
186. Id. at 397-98, 515 N.E.2d at 1225-26.
187. Id. at 403, 515 N.E.2d at 1228-29.
188. Id. at 394, 404, 515 N.E.2d at 1224, 1230. After the school board gave the
teacher written notice of the charges against him, the school board itself conducted the
teacher's suspension hearing. Id. at 397, 515 N.E.2d at 1226. The teacher had requested,
but was denied, a hearing before an independent hearing officer. Id. At the hearing, the
teacher had a lawyer and had the opportunity to cross-examine the school board's wit-
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suspend the teacher under the school code provision that grants
the school board general rule-making authority for its school
18 9
district.
In deciding whether the school board could suspend the teacher,
the court acknowledged that the School Code did not expressly
authorize suspensions of tenured teachers. 190 The court concluded,
however, that the school board had an implied power to suspend
based on its authority to make rules for the effective management
and government of the public schools within its district.' 91
The court then held that to effect a suspension, the board need
not follow the School Code hearing procedures governing the removal or dismissal of tenured teachers. 92 The court reasoned that
the School Code hearing procedures referred only to the "removal" or "dismissal" of tenured teachers, which suggested a permanent rather than temporary loss of employment.193
Additionally, the court noted that the legislature used the words
"suspend" and "suspension" in the School Code, yet failed to prescribe procedures for suspension hearings. 94 Therefore, the court
concluded that the school board's suspension procedures were
nesses and to present evidence on his own behalf. Id. at 398, 407, 515 N.E.2d at 1226,
1230.
189. Id. at 403, 515 N.E.2d at 1229.
190. Id. at 403, 515 N.E.2d at 1228 (citing Craddock v. Board of Educ., 76 Ill. App.
3d 43, 44, 391 N.E.2d 1059, 1060 (3d Dist. 1979)).
191. Id. at 404-05, 515 N.E.2d at 1228-29. The court adopted the reasoning in the
dissent in Craddock, 76 Ill. App. 3d at 49, 391 N.E.2d at 1064 (Alloy, J., dissenting):
If the Board is to adequately manage and govern ... the rules and regulations
which it adopts ... must have some means of enforcement which are effective.
There is an implied obligation to make rules and regulations, and to enforce
them ....

Enforcement envisions sanctions of some sort. If that were not the

case, the power to make rules would indeed be a hollow one and effective management and government could not be accomplished. Thus, it is from this section of the School Code that the power to make temporary suspensions arises.
Spinelli, 118 Ill. 2d at 405, 515 N.E.2d at 1229 (quoting Craddock, 76 Ill. App. 3d at 49,
391 N.E.2d at 1064 (Alloy, J., dissenting)). In Craddock, a teacher contested his temporary disciplinary suspension by his school board employer. Craddock, 76 Ill. App. 3d at
44, 391 N.E.2d at 1060. The Craddock court concluded that temporary dismissals were
included within the permanent dismissal provisions of the School Code. Id. at 45, 391
N.E.2d at 1061. Therefore, the court held that the school board had not satisfied the
dismissal provisions because it failed to follow the procedures set forth in the statute. Id.
at 46, 391 N.E.2d at 1061.
192. Spinelli, 118 Ill. 2d at 405, 515 N.E.2d at 1229-30. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122,
para. 24-12 (1987).
193. Spinelli, 118 Ill. 2d at 405-06, 515 N.E.2d at 1230.
194. Id. at 405-06, 515 N.E.2d at 1230 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, para. 24-12
(1987)). Paragraph 24-12 provides that "the board may suspend [a] teacher pending [a
removal or dismissal hearing], but if acquitted, the teacher shall not suffer the loss of any
salary by reason of the suspension." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, para. 24-12 (1987).
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valid so long as they satisfied procedural due process.1 95 The court
was proheld that due process was satisfied because the teacher
96
vided with notice and an opportunity for a hearing'
The Spinelli court was required to balance two competing interests: school boards have an interest in effective management of
their schools without undue administrative burden, and teachers
have an interest in avoiding the harm of unfair or erroneous suspensions. The court accommodated both interests by relieving the
school board of the more burdensome procedures applicable to discharge cases, yet requiring that suspensions satisfy due process
requirements.
D.

Illinois Prevailing Wage Act

Under the Illinois Prevailing Wage Act, 19 7 municipalities must
require contractors who receive municipal public works contracts
to pay their employees the same wages as those paid by other contractors performing similar public contract work in the county in
which the work is performed. 98 Nevertheless, the home rule provision in the Illinois Constitution allows municipalities to regulate
local municipal functions. 99 In People ex rel. Bernardi v. City of
195. Spinelli, 118 Ill. 2d at 406, 515 N.E.2d at 1230.
196. Id. at 406-07, 515 N.E.2d at 1230. See supra note 188.
197. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, paras. 39s-1 to 39s-12 (1987).
198. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, paras. 39s-1, 39s-3 (1987). Section 3 of the Prevailing
Wage Act provides in pertinent part:
Not less than the general prevailing rate of hourly wages for work of a similar
character on public works in the locality in which the work is performed, and
not less than the general prevailing rate of hourly wages for legal holiday and
overtime work, shall be paid to all laborers, workers and mechanics employed
by or on behalf of any public body engaged in the construction of public works.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 39s-3 (1987). According to section 2 of the Prevailing
Wage Act, "'[p]ublic works' means all fixed works constructed for public use by any
public body." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 39s-1 (1987). " 'Locality' means the county
where the physical work upon public works is performed .... " Id. "General prevailing
rate of hourly wages" means "the hourly cash wages plus fringe benefits ... paid generally, in the locality in which the work is performed, to employees engaged in work of a
similar character on public works." Id.
199. ILL. CONST., art. VII, § 6(a). Section 6(a) provides:
A County which has a chief executive officer elected by the electors of the
county and any municipality which has a population of more than 25,000 are
home rule units. Other municipalities may elect by referendum to become
home rule units. Except as limited by this section, a home rule unit may exercise any power and perform any function pertaining to its government and affairs including, but not limited to, the power to regulate for the protection of the
public health, safety, morals and welfare; to license; to tax; and to incur debt.

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 20

HighlandPark,2 °" the Illinois Supreme Court held that compliance
with the Prevailing Wage Act is a matter of state rather than local
concern and, therefore, home rule municipalities must comply with
its provisions.20 '
In Bernardi, the Illinois Department of Labor sought to enjoin
the City of Highland Park from awarding a public works contract
without first complying with the Prevailing Wage Act.2 °2 The city
contended that it did not have to comply with the Prevailing Wage
Act because it is a home rule municipality.0 3 In response, the Department of Labor maintained that the city had no home rule authority in this field because the Prevailing
Wage Act pertains to
24
statewide rather than local concerns. 0
In resolving the issue, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the
municipality's departure from prevailing wages tended to depress
wages throughout the county.20 5 In turn, the court reasoned, this
would affect the wages paid to public works employees outside of
the municipality.20 6 Additionally, the court noted that the Prevailing Wage Act, like other statutes establishing minimum standards
in employment, falls within a field traditionally subject to comprehensive state legislation. 2 7 The court reasoned that if a home rule
200. 121 Ill. 2d 1, 520 N.E.2d 316 (1988).
201. Id. at 4-5, 520 N.E.2d at 317.
202. Id. at 4, 520 N.E.2d at 317. The Department of Labor claimed that the city
violated the Wage Act because it failed to: ascertain the local wage level on public works
contracts; specify the prevailing wage level when soliciting bids from contractors; and
inform the contractors that the contractors would be required to pay the prevailing wage
to its employees. Id. at 5, 520 N.E.2d at 318.
203. Id. The circuit court agreed with the city, and the appellate and supreme courts
affirmed. Id. at 4, 520 N.E.2d at 317. The opinion discussed in this Survey is a rehearing
and reconsideration of the earlier Illinois Supreme Court decision. Id. See People ex rel.
Bernardi v. City of Highland Park, 105 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 55,665 (1986).
204. Bernardi, 121 Ill. 2d at 11, 520 N.E.2d at 320. Home rule authority has been
limited in areas that are traditionally subject to state regulation. Id. at 13-14, 520 N.E.2d
at 322 (citing Kalodimos v. Village of Morton Grove, 103 Ill. 2d 483, 470 N.E.2d 266
(1984)). For example, the Bernardicourt noted that state regulation of utility rates precluded home rule municipalities from enacting utility rate ordinances. Id. at 14, 520
N.E.2d at 322.
205. Id. at 13, 520 N.E.2d at 321-22.
206. Id. The court noted that because the prevailing wage was determined by wages
paid on public works contracts within the county, the low wages paid to the city's laborers would lower the prevailing wage paid in the entire county. Id.
207. Id. at 13-16, 520 N.E.2d at 321-23. The court pointed to the state's extensive
legislation in the area of labor regulation, citing statutes establishing eight-hour
workdays, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48., para. 1 (1987), providing equal pay for equal work,
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 4a (1987), regulating the employment of children, ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 31.1-31.12 (1987), restricting wage assignment, ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 48, para. 39.1-39.12 (1987), providing compensation for workers' injuries, ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 48, para. 138.1-138.30 (1987), forbidding employers to require employees to
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municipality could refuse to comply with the Prevailing Wage Act,
then the uniformity of state labor law would be undermined.2 "8
According to the Bernardi court, these factors indicated that the
city's interest in controlling public works wages was not a purely
local concern.2° Consequently, the city was required to comply
with the Prevailing Wage Act 21°and could not circumvent the statute on the basis of its home rule authority.2 "
E.

Illinois Pension Code

During the Survey year, the Illinois Supreme Court decided
three cases involving state pension code provisions.2 1 2 One decision involved the constitutionality of an amendment to the Pension
Code provisions for state university employees.21 3 The other cases
dealt with pension code eligibility requirements for firefighter disapay costs associated with mandatory pre-employment medical examinations, ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 48, para. 172d (1987), setting minimum fair wage standards for women and
minors, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 198.1-198.17 (1987), providing unemployment insurance, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 300-820 (1987), and providing a minimum wage,
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 1001-1015 (1987). Bernardi, 121 Ill. 2d at 14-15, 520
N.E.2d at 322. The court also recognized the interest of the state in promoting collective
bargaining in the public sector and of protecting local labor by giving public contract
preference to state citizens. Id. at 15, 520 N.E.2d at 322.
208. Bernardi, 121 Ill. 2d at 15, 520 N.E.2d at 322.
209. Id. at 13, 520 N.E.2d at 321.
210. Id. at 16, 520 N.E.2d at 323.
211. Id. at 13, 520 N.E.2d at 321.
212. During this Survey year, the Illinois Supreme Court also decided two cases interpreting the Federal Employment Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1461 (1982).
In Kennedy v. Deere & Co., 118 Ill. 2d 69, 514 N.E.2d 171 (1987), cert. denied, 108 S.
Ct. 1024 (1988), the Illinois Supreme Court held that a health care provider has standing
to sue under ERISA when benefits of employees covered by ERISA have been assigned to
the health care provider. Id. at 76, 514 N.E.2d at 174. The Kennedy court held that the
health care providers were "beneficiaries" under the Act and that Congress did not intend to restrict the class of beneficiaries entitled to receive such benefits. Id. at 74, 514
N.E.2d at 173.
In Arnold v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 123 Ill. 2d 67, 525 N.E.2d 59 (1988), the court
held that subsequent to the transfer of ownership of a company, employees of that company who retained their positions had no ERISA claims for severance benefits against the
selling employer. Id. at 77, 525 N.E.2d at 65. The court reasoned that although the
applicable severance pay plan made no mention of what would happen in the event of a
plant sale, the company's characterization of the plan as a private form of unemployment
compensation was reasonable. Id. The court also rejected the former employees' argument that the:company violated certain ERISA reporting requirements, and that, therefore, the employer's interpretation should be afforded little weight. Id. at 78-81, 525
N.E.2d at 65-66. Cf. Blau v. Del Monte Corp., 748 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1984) (numerous
violations of ERISA reporting requirements were probative of objectionable scheme to
deny severance benefits).
213. Buddell v. Board of Trustees, 118 Ill. 2d 99, 514 N.E.2d 184 (1987).

556

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 20

bility benefits.214
In Buddell v. Board of Trustees,1 5 the Illinois Supreme Court
addressed the constitutionality of a 1974 amendment to the Illinois
Pension Code.216 The Illinois Constitution of 1970 provides that a
public employee's pension benefits that are in force at the time he
begins working are unimpairable contractual obligations. 217 Prior
to 1974, the Pension Code allowed state university employees to
purchase pension credit for time they spent in the military.218 In
1974, the Illinois General Assembly amended the Pension Code to
disallow the purchase of military service credit.2 19 The Buddell
court held that the 1974 amendment to the Pension Code was unconstitutional to the extent that it divested the contractual rights of
university employees who 22were
employed when the 1970 Illinois
0
adopted.
was
Constitution
In Buddell, a state university employee attempted in 1983 to
purchase service credit for the time he spent in the military. 221 The
employee worked for Southern Illinois University when the Illinois
Constitution of 1970 became effective.222 At that time, the Pension
Code allowed employees to purchase military service credit.223 Between the time the employee first started, working and the time he
requested to purchase the credit, the statute was amended to disallow such purchase.224 Therefore, the employee's request to
purchase the credit was denied. 2 5
214. Di Falco v. Board of Trustees, 122 Ill. 2d 22, 521 N.E.2d 923 (1988); Herhold v.
Retirement Bd., 118 Ill. 2d 436, 515 N.E.2d 1240 (1987).
215. 118 Ill. 2d 99, 514 N.E.2d 184 (1987).
216. Id. at 100, 514 N.E.2d at 185.
217. Id. at 102, 514 N.E.2d at 186 (citing ILL. CONST., art. XIII, § 5). The Illinois
Constitution provides: "Membership in any pension or retirement system of the State,
any unit of local government or school district, or any agency or instrumentality thereof,
shall be an enforceable contractual relationship, the benefits of which shall not be diminished or impaired." ILL. CONST., art. XIII, § 5. Prior to 1970, the Illinois Constitution
did not contain this provision. Buddell, 118 I11.2d at 102, 514 N.E.2d at 186. Before
1970, the Illinois courts classified pension rights as either contractual or non-contractual
on a case-by-case basis. Id. (citing Comment, Public Employee Pension Rights and the
1970 Illinois Constitution: Does Article XIII, Section 5 Guarantee IncreasedProtection?,9
J. MARSHALL J. PRAC. & PROC. 440, 445-49 (1976)).

218. Buddell, 118 Ill. 2d at 101, 514 N.E.2d at 185. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 108 1/2,
para. 15-113(i) (1969).
219. Buddell, 118 Ill. 2d at 101, 514 N.E.2d at 185. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 108 1/2,
para. 15-113(i) (1987).
220. Buddell, 118 Ill. 2d at 106, 514 N.E.2d at 188.
221. Id. at 101, 514 N.E.2d at 185.
222. Id. at 103, 514 N.E.2d at 186.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
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The Illinois Supreme Court held that the denial of military service credit was unconstitutional.2

26

The Buddell court reasoned

that because the Pension Code provisions allowed the employee to
purchase military service credit at the time that the Illinois Constitution of 1970 became effective, the right to purchase that credit
could not be diminished or impaired. 227 Accordingly, the court

held that the employee had a vested right to purchase pension
credit for the time he spent in the military. 228 The court further
held that the Pension Code amendment is unconstitutional to the
extent that it operates to divest the employee of his right to service
credit.229
The Illinois Supreme Court addressed another pension benefit
question in Di Falco v. Board of Trustees.2a° The Firemen's Pension Fund section of the Illinois Pension Code 23' provides that
firefighters who are injured on the job are entitled to collect dutyrelated disability pensions.232 The Di Falco court held that a
firefighter qualifies for a duty-related disability pension only if he is
still employed as a firefighter at the time he applies for the
226. Id. at 101-06, 514 N.E.2d at 185-88.
227. Id. at 104-05, 514 N.E.2d at 187. The court refused to draw an analogy between
the Buddell case and Peters v. City of Springfield, 57 Ill. 2d 142, 311 N.E.2d 107 (1974).
Buddell, 118 Ill. 2d at 103-04, 514 N.E.2d at 186-87. In Peters, a municipality adopted a
mandatory retirement age provision for firefighters pursuant to the Illinois Municipal
Code. Peters, 57 111. 2d at 143-44, 311 N.E.2d at 108. The mandatory retirement age had
an indirect effect on the amount of pension benefits paid to municipal retirees under the
Pension Code. Id. at 150-51, 311 N.E.2d at 111-12. The Illinois Supreme Court held
that the mandatory retirement age provision did not unconstitutionally diminish the contractual pension rights of the municipal employees because the provision only had an
indirect effect on pension benefits. Id. at 151-52, 311 N.E.2d at 112. The Buddell court
distinguished Peters by noting that Buddell involved changes in the Pension Code itself,
which had a direct rather than an indirect effect on the employee's pension benefits. Buddell, 118 Ill. 2d at 104, 514 N.E.2d at 187.
The Illinois Supreme Court also rejected the argument that because the employee did
not attempt to purchase the military service credit before the statutory cut-off date, his
benefit had not "vested." Id. at 105-06, 514 N.E.2d at 187-88. The court held that it was
not the military service credit itself that was guaranteed to the employee, but rather the
right to purchase such credit. Id.
228. Buddell, 118 Ill. 2d at 106, 514 N.E.2d at 188.
229. Id.
230. 122 Ill. 2d 22, 521 N.E.2d 923 (1988).
231. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 108 1/2, paras. 4-101 to 4-144 (1987).
232. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 108 1/2, para. 4-110 (1987). In this case, the relevant pension code provisions were those in effect when the firefighter began employment. Di
Falco, 122 Ill. 2d at 26, 521 N.E.2d at 925. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 108 1/2, paras. 4-101
to 4-143 (1981). Under article XIII, section 5 of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, the
rights that the employee had under the pension provisions were determined by those
provisions in effect at the time the firefighter was hired. Di Falco, 122 Ill. 2d at 26, 521
N.E.2d at 925. See ILL. CONST., art. XIII, § 5. For a discussion of this constitutional
provision, see supra notes 215-29 and accompanying text.
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pension.23 3

In Di Falco, a former probationary firefighter sought to collect
benefits for a duty-related disability one year after his discharge. 3
The Firemen's Pension Fund Board of Trustees claimed that the
former firefighter was not entitled to disability benefits because he
was no longer a "fireman" under the Pension Code. 235 The
firefighter argued that unless former firefighters were allowed to
claim disability benefits, pension boards would routinely discharge
injured firefighters before they could apply for disability benefits,
and thereby avoid having to pay their pensions.236
In rejecting the firefighter's claim, the Di Falco court noted several pension code provisions which indicate that the legislature intended the duty-related disability provision to provide for firemen
who, but for the disability, would still be employed. 237 The court
also noted that the purpose of the duty-related pension would not
be served if a disability pension were granted to a person who lost
his job as a firefighter, not because of a disability, but rather be233. Di Falco, 122 Ill. 2d at 33, 521 N.E.2d at 928.
234. Id. at 25, 521 N.E.2d at 924-25.
235. Id. at 25-26, 521 N.E.2d at 924-25.
236. Id. at 31, 521 N.E.2d at 927. The appellate court overturned the trial court's
holding that the firefighter's application for benefits was untimely. Id. at 24, 521 N.E.2d
at 924. The appellate court rejected this holding because it determined that nothing in
the Pension Code precluded a discharged firefighter from eligibility for disability pensions. Id. at 26, 521 N.E.2d at 925. According to the appellate court, the firefighter had
a vested right to receive a disability pension. Id. The appellate court concluded that
disallowing the firefighter's pension application impaired the firefighter's contractual
right to pension benefits. Id. The Illinois Supreme Court disagreed, noting that the
firefighter had merely failed to meet a condition precedent to receiving his vested right to
disability pension benefits by failing to make a timely application for those benefits. Id. at
30-31, 521 N.E.2d at 927.
237. Id. at 26-30, 521 N.E.2d at 925-27. The court noted that the Pension Code
provides a-duty-related disability pension for a "fireman" injured on the job, ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 108 1/2, para. 4-110 (1987), and that the definition of "fireman" is "any person
employed by a city in its fire service .... " ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 108 1/2, para. 4-106(c)
(1987). Di Falco, 122 Ill. 2d at 26-27, 521 N.E.2d at 925. In determining that a fireman
must be employed at the time of application for benefits as well as at the time of injury,
the court looked to other sections of the Pension Code. Id. at 27-30, 521 N.E.2d at 92527. In part, the court relied on a provision in the Pension Code that mandates reinstatement of an active-duty firefighter after he recovers from his disability. Id. at 28, 521
N.E.2d at 926 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 108 1/2, para. 4-112 (1987)). The court reasoned that it would be impossible to comply with the mandate of the reinstatement provision because a discharged firefighter could not be restored to his position if he was not
employed in active duty at the time his disability pension began. Id. at 24, 521 N.E.2d at
926. Similarly, the court noted that a firefighter on disability may elect to retire and
receive a retirement pension, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 108 1/2, para. 4-113 (1987), but that a
discharged fire fighter may not elect to retire from a position that he no longer fills. Di
Falco, 122 Ill. 2d at 29-30, 521 N.E.2d at 926.
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cause he was discharged.2 8 Additionally, the court dismissed the
firefighter's argument that pension boards would attempt to discharge injured fire fighters before they could apply for disability
benefits.239 In dismissing this argument, the court noted that there
was no evidence of such abuse in this case and that safeguards exist
which make the likelihood of such abuses extremely remote.2 °
Specifically, the Board of Fire Commissioners, rather than the Pension Board, controls employee discharges.24 1 Moreover, the Board
of Fire Commissioners may not discharge fire department employees except for cause.242 In the case of probationary fire fighters, the
municipality must act in good faith.2 43 Therefore, the court concluded that the remote possibility of departmental abuse did not
warrant extending the Pension Code provisions to former
employees. 2 "
The Illinois Supreme Court decided another firefighter disability
pension question in Herhold v. Retirement Board.245 In 1983, the
Firemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund section of the Pension Code
("Firemen's Fund") 246 was amended to include paramedics in its
definition of "firemen.

' 247

Among the benefits provided by the

Firemen's Fund is a pension for non-duty-related disabilities.248
The Herhold court held that a paramedic who was employed prior
to the amendment was entitled to receive disability benefits based
on the total length of his period of service as a paramedic.249
The Herhold employee was a paramedic who contributed to a
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

Di Falco, 122 Ill. 2d at 27, 521 N.E.2d at 925.
Id. at 31-32, 521 N.E.2d at 927.
Id.
Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127 1/2, para. 37.13 (1987)).
Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, paras. 10-2.1-17, 10-1-18 (1987); ILL. REV.

STAT. ch. 127 1/2, para. 37.13 (1987)).

243. Id. at 31-32, 521 N.E.2d at 927 (citing Kennedy v. City of Joliet, 380 Ill. 15, 41
N.E.2d 957 (1942)).
244. Id.
245. 118 Ill. 2d 436, 515 N.E.2d 1240 (1987).
246. Id. at 437, 515 N.E.2d at 1241. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 108 1/2,
paras. 6-101 to 6-225 (1987).
247. Herhold, 118 Ill. 2d at 437, 515 N.E.2d at 1241. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
108 1/2, para. 6-106(a) (1987).
248. Herhold, 118 Ill. 2d at 437, 515 N.E.2d at 1241. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
108 1/2, para. 6-152 (1987). Paragraph 6-152 provides in pertinent part:
Any fireman who is not eligible for a minimum annuity, who becomes disabled
after the effective date as the result of any cause other than the performance of
an act or acts of duty... shall have a right to receive ordinary disability benefits
during any period or periods of such disability after the first 30 days of the
disability.
Id.
249. Herhold, 118 Ill. 2d at 441-43, 515 N.E.2d at 1243-44.
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municipal employees' pension fund 250 until the Firemen's Fund
was amended to include paramedics in the definition of a "firemen."251 The paramedic then stopped contributing to the municipal pension fund and began contributing to the Firemen's Fund.252
After switching pension funds, the employee became ill and applied for a disability pension under the Firemen's Fund.253 The
Firemen's Fund Retirement Board awarded the employee disability benefits based on the amount of time that he had contributed to
the Firemen's Fund rather than on the amount of time that he had
served as a paramedic.254
In rejecting the Retirement Board's action, the court relied upon
certain provisions in the Pension Code.2 5 The court noted that the
Firemen's Fund provided benefits for a "fireman" based on his or
total period of service256 or duty. 257 Accordingly, the court reasoned that everybody included in the statutory definition of "firemen" is entitled to receive Firemen's Fund benefits based on their
total period of service. 25 8 Thus, when the Pension Code was
amended to include paramedics in the definition of "firemen," the
same provisions became equally applicable to paramedics. 9
V.

UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION

Section 703 of the Illinois Unemployment Insurance Act ("Unemployment Act") allows the Illinois Department of Labor ("De250.

Municipal Employees', Officers' and Officials' Annuity and Benefit Fund, ILL.
ch. 108 1/2, paras. 8-101 to 8-253 (1987).
251. Herhold, 118 111. 2d at 437, 515 N.E.2d at 1241.
252. Id. When the paramedic left the municipal fund, the contributions he had made
to the municipal fund were refunded. Id. at 440, 515 N.E.2d at 1242. The transferee
fund did not participate in the Retirement Systems Reciprocal Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
108 1/2, paras. 20-101 to 20-133 (1987). Therefore, the Firemen's Fund would not accept a transfer of funds. Herhold, 118 Ill. 2d at 440, 515 N.E.2d at 1242.
253. Herhold, 118 Ill. 2d at 437, 515 N.E.2d at 1241.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 438-41, 515 N.E.2d at 1241-43 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 108 1/2, para.
6-152 (1987); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 108 1/2, para. 6-209 (1987)).
256. Id. at 438-40, 515 N.E.2d at 1241-42 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 108 1/2, para.
6-152 (1987) (providing that computation of duration of disability payments is based on
the "entire service of the fireman")).
257. Id. at 438-40, 515 N.E.2d at 1242 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 108 1/2, para. 6109 (1987) (providing that computation of length of a fireman's service for purposes of
fireman's pension rights is based in part on "periods during which he performed the
duties of his position")).
258. Id. at 439, 515 N.E.2d at 1242.
259. Id. The court also concluded that because the paramedic was not offered the
option of transferring his pension contributions to the new fund, he could not be penalized for having received a refund of contributions to the previous fund. Id. at 440, 515
N.E.2d at 1242-43. See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
REV. STAT.
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partment") one year to reconsider an employee's eligibility for
unemployment benefits.2eo Section 900(A)(2) of the Unemployment Act authorizes the Department to recoup improperly obtained benefits within three years of the reconsidered
determination. 26' A separate section of the Unemployment Act
authorizes the Department to recover benefits in the event an employee receives a back pay award for the period that the employee
received the unemployment benefits.26 2 In Weingart v. Department
of Labor,2 6 3 the Illinois Supreme Court held that in order for the
Department to recoup benefits paid to employees who later receive
back pay awards, the Department must redetermine the employ26 4
ees' benefit eligibility within the one-year statutory time limit.
In Weingart, two former employees received back pay awards
that covered time periods for which they had received unemployment compensation. 265 The former employer advised the Department's unemployment insurance division of the back pay
260. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 453 (1987). Section 703 of the Unemployment
Act provides in pertinent part: "The claims adjudicator ... may reconsider his determination [of an employee's eligibility for benefits] at any time within one year after the last
day of the week for which the determination was made ....
Id.
After an initial determination of an employee's benefit rate under the Unemployment
Act, a determination of eligibility to receive weekly benefits is made on a week-by-week
basis. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, paras. 451-452 (1987).
261. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 490(A)(2) (1987). Section 900(A)(2) of the Unemployment Act provides:
A. Whenever an individual has received any sum as benefits for which he is
found to have been ineligible, the amount thereof may be recovered by suit in
the name of the People of the State of Illinois, or, from the benefits payable to
him may be recouped:
2.

Within 3 years from the date ... he has been found to have been ineligible
pursuant to a reconsidered finding or a reconsidered determination, or pursuant to the decision of a Referee (or of the Director or his representative under
Section 604) which modifies or sets aside ... a determination or a reconsidered
determination.
...

Id.
262. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 490(D) (1987). Section 900(D) of the Unemployment Act provides in pertinent part: "Whenever, by reason of a back pay award .... an
individual has received wages for weeks with respect to which he has received benefits,
the amount of such benefits may be recouped or otherwise recovered as herein provided
....
Id..
263. 122 Ill. 2d 1, 521 N.E.2d 913 (1988).
264. Id. at 7-17, 521 N.E.2d at 916-20.
265. Id. at 4, 521 N.E.2d at 914. The employer closed its Illinois facility after its
employees elected a union to represent them. Id. The union filed a complaint with the
National Labor Relations Board. Id. The union and the employer subsequently settled
the dispute. Id. As a result of the settlement, the former employees received back pay
awards. Id.
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awards.266 Several months later, and more than one year after each
employee had received a final unemployment check, the Department retroactively declared the former employees ineligible for the
benefits they received 267 and sought to recoup the benefits paid.268
The former employees contested the Department's redetermination. 269 The circuit court ruled in favor of the employer, holding
that section 703 did not apply to back pay awards. 27 0 The appellate court reversed, holding that section 703 required the Department to make a redetermination of eligibility within one year of the
final determination. 27 1 The appellate court concluded that the De-

partment's actions were time-barred because the last week for
which the employees received unemployment compensation was
outside of section 703's one-year statute of limitations. 272 The Department argued that the separate recoupment provision for back
pay awards rendered the section 703 time limits inapplicable.273
266. Id. at 5-6, 521 N.E.2d at 915.
267. Id. Both of the former employees in this case were unemployed as of August
1980, when the employer closed its plant. Id. at 4, 521 N.E.2d at 914. One employee
received unemployment benefits from August 1980 through July 1981. Id. The other
employee received benefits from August 1980 through May 1981. Id. One and one-half
years after the plant closing, the employer entered into the settlement agreement that
resulted in back pay awards to the former plant employees. Id. at 4-5, 521 N.E.2d at 91415. The back pay award covered the time period from September 1980 through May
1981. Id. at 5, 521 N.E.2d at 915. The first employee received her back pay award in two
installments; one in January 1982, and the other in February 1982. Id. at 4-5, 521 N.E.2d
at 914. The second employee received her award in January 1982. Id. at 5, 521 N.E.2d
at 914-15.
In March 1982, the employer advised the Department of the back pay awards. Id. at 5,
521 N.E.2d at 915. In September 1982, the first employee received a notice from the
Department that it had reconsidered her determination of eligibility and it was seeking
recoupment of the benefits that she had received. Id. The second employee received her
notice of redetermination and recoupment from the Department in April 1983. Id. at 6,
521 N.E.2d at 915.
268. Id.
269. Id. Each of the two employees first contested the Department's redetermination
by appeal to a Department referee, who affirmed the validity of the Department's actions.
Id. at 5-6, 521 N.E.2d at 915. Likewise, the Department's board of review affirmed the
referees' decisions. Id. Both employees sought judicial review of the board's decisions in
the Circuit Court of Cook County. Id.
270. Id. at 6, 521 N.E.2d at 915.
271. Id. at 6-7, 521 N.E.2d at 915.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 10-11, 521 N.E.2d at 917-18. The Department also claimed that, in retrospect, the former employees misstated their earnings because they later received back pay
awards for the same time period for which the employees received unemployment benefits. Id. at 16, 521 N.E.2d at 920. Under the Unemployment Act, if benefit recipients
misstate their earnings, then a two-year rather than a one-year time limit applies. See
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 453 (1987). Therefore, the Department claimed that a twoyear limitations period applied in this case. Weingart, 122 Ill. 2d at 16, 521 N.E.2d at
920. The Illinois Supreme Court concluded that the former employees did not misstate
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The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's ruling
that the Department's redetermination and recoupment were time
barred.274 The court reasoned that section 900A(2) of the Unemployment Act clearly conditions recoupment upon a timely redetermination of eligibility.2 75 The court found no special exception
for recoupment actions undertaken because of subsequent back pay
awards. 27 6 Hence, the court held that the Department could not

recoup the benefits because it failed to comply with the section
900(A)(2) recoupment provision.277 In support of its holding, the
court noted that the Unemployment Act reflects a balance between
the interests of the employer in recovering improperly obtained
benefits and the interest of the claimant in knowing with certainty
which benefits he must pay back. 278 The court reasoned that if the

legislature's only objective in enacting the recoupment provision
was to recover improperly obtained benefits, the legislature would
not have placed any time limits on recovery. 279 Therefore, the
court held that the Department's attempted recoupment was time
barred because it failed to make a timely redetermination of
eligibility.280

VI. CONCLUSION
During the Survey year, the Illinois Supreme Court expanded
the scope of retaliatory discharge in the context of an employee's
assertion of rights under the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act.
their earnings at the time the employees applied for benefits. Id. at 16-17, 521 N.E.2d at
920.
Additionally, the court considered whether one of the former employees filed a timely
complaint for administrative review of the Department's redetermination. Id. at 17, 520
N.E.2d at 920-22. The court held that the board's decision was void and could be attacked at any time because the Department lacked the power to make the redetermination in the first place. Id.
274. Weingart, 122 Ill. 2d at 18, 521 N.E.2d at 921.
275. Id. at 9, 521 N.E.2d at 916-17. The court stated that the time limitations set
forth in section 703 of the Unemployment Act were incorporated into the recoupment
provision by specific reference in section 900(A)(2) to reconsidered determinations. Id.
See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
276. Weingart, 122 Ill. 2d at 11, 521 N.E.2d at 917-18.
277. Id. at 12, 521 N.E.2d at 918. The court reasoned that the back pay recoupment
provision in section 900(D) of the Unemployment Act specifically provides that recoupment of back pay shall be made "as herein provided." Id. at 11, 521 N.E.2d at 917. The
court concluded that if the "as herein provided" phrase is not read in connection with the
remainder of section 900, the statute would not provide a mechanism for determining
ineligibility for benefits or for the recoupment of benefits in the case of back pay awards.
Id. at 11, 521 N.E.2d at 917-18.
278. Id. at 14, 521 N.E.2d at 919.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 17, 521 N.E.2d at 920.
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The court also declared unconstitutional a statute that provided
employees with the right to inspect their personnel files, leading the
Illinois Legislature to amend the statute to provide greater inspection rights to employees. Additionally, the court interpreted public employment laws consistently with a legislative preference for
collective bargaining and arbitration. Finally, in a decision affecting the rights of Illinois organized labor, the United States
Supreme Court approved retaliatory discharge suits by union
employees.

